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Issue 
In South Sudan, Juba matters, but it is just one seat of power and contestation; the spatial and temporal variation 
of conflict and governance across the rest of the country equally demands to be understood. The significance 
of this dynamic is underscored by the agreements made in February and June 2020 between South Sudan’s 
warring parties - the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS), the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In 
Opposition (SPLA-IO) and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) - regarding the (re)division of the country 
into ten states, and which party would be allocated the right to nominate a governor for each of the ten states, 
giving that party de facto control of the state itself. 1 These agreements came after years of contention, since 
the GRSS unilaterally decreed that the country be subdivided into 28 and then 32 states, to the protest of many.2 
The issue has remained vexed throughout the conflict and was a key sticking point during negotiations for the 
R-ARCSS3  2018 peace deal, as this agreement determines the demarcation and allocation of power and shapes 
the use of violence across the country.
Research Background
This research brief outlines some of the dynamics of local conflict and governance through the recent civil war 
across South Sudan, based on research undertaken in five ‘case study’ locations: Gogrial, Malakal, Leer, Nimule, 
and Abyei. It provides analysis regarding the likely nature of governance and conflict across the country as it 
proceeds with the R-ARCSS implementation and beyond. The findings in this brief are drawn from a full Conflict 
Research Programme (CRP) report: The War(s) in South Sudan: local dynamics of conflict, governance, and the 
political marketplace. The research utilises findings from a larger CRP project, employing a comparative political 
ethnography approach, co-designed by a team of CRP researchers, 4 and implemented by South Sudanese 
researchers embedded in the locations. The analysis draws upon a combined total of 343 interviews, observation 
reports, and transcripts, gathered between April 2018 and September 2019. While there are certain limitations 
to this research, the data provides detailed snapshots of perspectives at the community level, which have been 
interpreted alongside participant-observations, deliberations, and joint analyses undertaken by the wider CRP 
team, using the lens of the CRP’s two interlocking framings: ‘public authority’ and the ‘political marketplace’ (See 
Box 1).
1  Al Jazeera (2020) South Sudan leaders reach key deal on control of states. 17 June.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/south-sudan-leaders-reach-key-deal-control-states-200617162203652.html
2  The SPLA-IO, South Sudanese civil society and international partners opposed this decree.       
3  Revitalised-Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan.
4  The research was co-designed by Rachel Ibreck, Naomi Pendle, and Hannah Logan. The South Sudanese researchers 
formed the Bridge Network in November 2017. The team met annually for joint analysis between 2017-2020, including with Flora 






Evident through this research was that, while public authority – both formal and informal – and political marketplace 
dynamics, varied considerably across the five research sites, a number of important commonalities also emerged in some 
or all locations, regarding their evolving roles through the conflict(s) and relationships with South Sudan’s centre of power. 
1. The civil war since 2013 has provided a vehicle for localised violent conflicts over land, business, and natural resources. 
In the second Sudanese civil war, it was expected that resolving the ‘problem’ with the north would resolve the conflict. 
In the recent war, that assumption has shifted to focus on resolving the problem in Juba. But as this research has made 
clear, there is no singular ‘war in South Sudan’ that radiates out of Juba. Rather, the ‘peripheries’ across the country are 
bound up with a conflict rooted in the politics of the centre but also in their own localised conflicts. Resolving these will 
take a lot more than just the R-ARCSS – however, an alternative forum has not been proposed under the agreement.
2. Gubernatorial conflict emerged as a major conflict driver in recent years. At the time of writing, final decisions around the 
allocation of certain states to the warring parties and their appointments for the governors’ role, were still in question. 
In the near future, we should anticipate that such decisions could precipitate tension or violent conflict and ongoing 
contestation. Nonetheless, the warring parties’ recent agreement to restore the ten-states system, rather than pursuing 
subdivision into 28 or 32 or more states, could arguably contribute to the non-violent resolution of conflict. Further 
administrative sub-division risks contributing to a new wave of conflict, over the demarcation of new boundaries, as well 
as further diluting the public authority and stretching the availability of public goods for effective local governance. The 
research suggests that further decentralisation proposals in the future should be carefully monitored with an eye on the 
extent to which it contributes to violent conflict.
3. On the other hand, we have also seen that decentralised governance even under South Sudan’s ten-state system still 
holds a number of significant violent conflict triggers and creates a climate in which the political marketplace can flourish 
or become further embedded locally. In future, the introduction of local electoral politics planned under the R-ARCSS, will 
likely add another layer of local contestation. Based on these findings, one mitigation strategy for this would be to attempt 
to de-link local governance units and positions from particular ‘ethnic fiefdoms’, to prevent the further sectarianisation 
of local politics.
4. South Sudan’s chiefs and other local governance actors are often highly militarised and politicised and have participated 
directly in conflict, through the recruitment of local youth into armed groups or the coordination of attacks on neighbouring 
communities. Moreover, the public authority and legitimacy of chiefs and other local actors has been severely degraded 
in recent years. Much local peace-building work to date has emphasised working with chiefs as a blanket approach, 
who are seen as the most legitimate and capable partners through which external organisations can do peace work 
at the community level. The CRP’s research suggests that South Sudan’s peace-building partners should recognise the 
complexity and potentially problematic nature of working with some actors, looking to other forms of public authorities 
to engage in peacebuilding work: teachers, local journalists, and other actors could be considered alternative suitable 
peace partners.
5. A contemporary strain of elite-driven cattle conflict is becoming a key symptom of the political marketplace. That 
is, wealthy elites - in the government and military, based in Juba and elsewhere - belonging to some cattle-keeping 
communities attempt to foment land-based conflict in order to expand their cattle herds, grazing land, and territorial 
control, coordinating and mobilising conflict using cash, mobile phones, and social media. However, the role of elites, 
money, and technology and other ‘outside’ or urban influences within these conflicts remains under-examined. In the 
absence of in-depth context analysis, outsiders have commonly assumed that localised conflict is simply ‘traditional’ 
and ‘inter-communal,’ leading external partners to undertake traditional approaches of local peace meetings which, in the 
case of such variants of conflict, will be at best ineffective and at worst may feed into the conflict by providing legitimacy 
or resources to problematic actors. The priority therefore with emerging ‘local’ conflicts is first to analyse, because poorly 
formulated peace-building efforts will likely be ineffectual or could even worsen the conflict.
Box 1
Public Authority: Public authority is a widely applicable term when seeking to understand the functioning of 
power and institutions in Africa. The term refers to both organisations and actors that are outwardly ‘political’ or 
‘government,’ but also those that are ostensibly neither, and yet still participate in the negotiation of power and 
governance.
Political Marketplace: in South Sudan, ‘political marketplace’ refers to the gaining and maintaining of power, based 
upon a “speeded up, dollarised mode of transactional politics,” in which it’s nascent state-level institutions are 
subordinate to bargaining for political gain among a narrow group of elites.
3
6. The conflict dynamics described above could also play into processes of political decentralisation, in that land-based 
conflicts and efforts for territorial control (often involving cattle and herders) will be exacerbated by disputes over 
administrative boundaries and attempts to gain territorial control over new administrative units. Again, real-time research 
and analysis into the shifting interests over land and territory, that keeps abreast of the ongoing implementation of the 
R-ARCSS, will be necessary in order to understand and respond to emerging ‘local’ conflicts.
7. South Sudan’s colonial experience, and subsequently the first and second civil wars, drove a tribalisation or sectarianisation 
of communities; propagating this version of community identity served as a means for conflicting elites to invoke 
legitimacy and influence, in lieu of providing more tangible public resources. In this context, through the first two civil 
wars, the ethnic affiliations of the conflicts’ leaders became a powerful means to invoke the support of communities. 
However, this research tentatively indicates that in locations which have produced some of South Sudan’s most senior 
leaders, the ethnic affiliation of their home communities, and the once-powerful narrative of ‘liberation,’ appear to hold 
increasingly less sway among communities, in the absence of public service provision by the GRSS. We might expect to 
see that, as the GRSS and its citizenry matures, communities’ expectations of public service provision will likely increase, 
leading to greater dissatisfaction with government. In this light, the research suggests that fostering future stability will 
require concerted efforts by South Sudan to improve the GRSS’ capacity for public service provision.
8. Relatedly, stark inequalities have been produced by decades of conflict and the burgeoning elite-dominated political 
marketplace. ‘Peace’ following the CPA resulted in huge dividends for a small handful of elites, but very little for 
communities, which continue to exist in a state of chronic underdevelopment. External partners need to find other 
ways to make local peacebuilding ‘stick,’ which should focus on addressing these deep inequalities produced by the 
burgeoning elite-dominated political marketplace. For a future, more robust peace, the living circumstances of ordinary 
communities must be improved. The research indicates that coupling peace-building efforts with more tangible dividends 
- infrastructure programming or enforceable local contracts over resources - creates the credible incentive.
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